What this means is that a given set of opportunities will induce a different amount of migration in populations of different compositions. This can be rationalized either by specifying a general set of inducements and constraints, with different evaluational parameter values for different parts of the population; or specifying different sets of inducements and constraints specific to the different individuals and groups in the population. Both of these approaches will be used in this paper when they seem appropriate.
Three types of migration movement have to be explained. First is the move which can be characterized in aggregative average terms as from an origin of inferior opportunities to a destination of superior opportunities. This is the form of migration most congenial to the conventional aggregate economic rationality model. Second is the move from an origin with opportunities on the average greater than those of the destination. Third is the staged migration where, for reasons of expense or staged information gathering, a move is made from origin i to some destination j which is envisaged as only a temporary resting place rather than the true or final destination.
Thus an observed move from i to j will not generally be explainable as the most advantageous available (utility maximizing) . The second and third types will usually be difficult or impossible to explain in aggregate models dealing with average individuals. They require the agent-specific opportunities and constraints describable in disaggregated models.
In such a context the return home of disappointed earlier migrants, or the special advantageous opportunities opened to a favored few in otherwise impoverished areas, can be easily understood and modeled. And the temporary expedient of partial moves, either half-heartedly sampled, or avowedly used as a staging area, on the way to a more seriously anticipated destination, can be rationalized in strategic terms in such micro-approaches. Our treatment of individual migration decisions will attempt to provide a single analytic framework that integrates all three types of move.
III.
A Calculus of Rational Migration Choice
The basic approach to individual migration decisions is to assume that each member of the population performs the following calculation: at each point of time he or she perceives that a choice has to be made between remaining a resident of his (her) current region and moving to another region.
Each region, including the current place of residence, is perceived as possessing a set of opportunities and constraints relevant to the calculation; in addition, if the move were made, a set of costs would be incurred.
By evaluating each of the regions as an alternative prospect in utility terms, and subtracting the cost of moving to it in utility terms, the subject forms a utility level for each hypothetical course of action. If a move to any new region yields an expected utility level greater than that associated with remaining in the current region, the subject will become a migrant. He or she will migrate to that region that promises the highest expected utility level.
This formulation, certainly a conventional one, requires four basic elements: the benefits characterization of a move to any new region, the costs involved in each such move, the character and extent of the information about these benefits and costs, and the utility significance of each component of benefits and costs -or, more appropriately, the utility evaluation of each bundle of benefit and cost components by the particular agent making the decision.
In sections that follow, we shall consider each of these elements in turn. Now we shall simply list some of the items to be considered.
On the benefits side, we shall treat improvement in job prospects, in First is the notion that "the income" to be associated with a given region is generated through employment, but that a given region does not represent either one particular job or one particular income. the original probability distribution also influence the payoff to sampling.
The money gains to sampling are independent of an individual's attitude toward risk. But of course the utility significance of such gains is dependent on such attitudes. The fact that the set of alternative migration destinations will generally contain a variety of mean-variance tradeoffs means that attitudes toward risk may be an important ground on the basis of which otherwise similar individuals (e.g., skills, length of residence) will evaluate income prospects from the same set of prospects quite differently. These differences in evaluation refer both to the decision to migrate at all, and the relative attractiveness of different possible destinations.
The importance of variance as a migration incentive serves not only to self-select certain types of people as migrants but also to select certain regions as especially popular destinations for migration from whatever origins.
If high variance is attractive, then it is the very large urban areas that are likely to provide it, because they have both the scale and variety of jobs to make very different career patterns possible. Even largeness of market alone serves this, because natural job turnover there offers many attractive, if low probability, opportunities. Since large size is also generally associated with large variety, the variance of outcomes is even more pronounced in large metropolitan areas. These, then, come to exercise a migratory pull out of proportion to any advantage they may show in the mean level of their returns.
Even mean incomes lower than that in some smaller destinations will be offset for many migrants by the more adventurous risks of "the big town." 6. Another personal characteristic enters to influence the evaluation of a given set of alternative income prospects. This is the investment in human capital.
If an individual has just completed significant investment in human capital -say, by a quantum increase in education -then that part of the probability distribution of jobs previously most relevant to him or her is no longer so relevant. A new, higher skilled subset is now more appropriate. In the last section we spoke of earnings differentials as a chief incentive for migration. The differentials were expressed in nominal money terms.
Clearly, the differentials that matter are "real income" differentials. Different public services will of course differ in playing these twin roles.
Moreover, the two roles will generally have different utility impact for potential migrants in different circumstances -since transition difficulties will loom larger for some than for others. Thus for reasons over and above Moving costs include the removal of personal property and personal transportation to the migration destination. The size of these costs is clearly a positive function of the amount of property possessed, the size of the family proposing to migrate, and the distance to be traveled. For a given set of potential benefits from migration, the existence of moving costs clearly has unequal deterring impact on migration. Other things equal, it favors for migration: 1) younger people with weak familial obligations and small amount of accumulated property, 2) individuals institutionally or culturally more mobile -in many societies, predominantly males, 3) small families or single persons, 4) close destinations.
Where especially single persons are involved, moving costs are one-time expenditures which are small relative to expected lifetime earnings differentials.
On this score they may not be expected to have a strong negative influence on migration. But they may represent large absolute amounts at one time.
They may well be larger than accumulated savings of just that group that is otherwise least deterred. In contexts where capital markets are notably imperfect, especially with regard to human capital (migration being a form of locational investment in human capital) , this can stifle migration that would otherwise have been economically rational.
This factor is, of course, especially important for international migration, where significantly lumpy minimum distances are involved. It is less so for internal migration where distances can be graduated more continuously, One adjustment in internal migration is the strategy of staged migration, where a desired long distance move is broken into shorter-distance stages, the migrant stopping at each stage primarily to accumulate more capital in order to finance further stages -although unexpected good fortune in job search and experience at each stage can serve to short-circuit original migration plans.
Another impact of the minimum capital requirement to finance migration is that individuals (families) with adequate accumulated capital will be less deterred from migration relative to the favored categories listed above than sheer relative size of moving costs would suggest. The capital as well as the net returns flow dimensions of moving costs must be considered to compare the relative influence on different portions of the potential migrants.
So somewhat older, more successful, larger families may comprise a non-trivial share of actual migrants on this score.
2.
A second set of costs are transition costs. These are the cost of settling-in to a new, unfamiliar milieu, where housing, shopping and other contacts require gradual, possibly painful orientation periods. It often includes an indefinite period of unemployment as the process of job search in a new location has to begin at the very beginning. These are in effect one-time set-up costs -a necessary investment in "locational social capital". In 22 international migration and even in some forms of internal migration the learning of a new language is required.
While the same repertoire of information is required of everyone, individuals differ in how much they already know, in how difficult attainment of the rest is, and in how important this set of efforts is. The utility significance of the possibility of an initial period of unemployment is especially likely to differ among individuals. Since it occurs before the migrant has had an opportunity to take advantage of the anticipated increment of earnings over his recent origin, his asset position is likely to be unusually weak. His vulnerability to a period of unemployment at that time may be very great. At one extreme, some migrants move with a job already arranged for, or have the kinds of skill that practically guarantee a short initial unemployment period, or they come with adequate assets; at the other extreme, some have no specific job prospects, and have skills not easy to fit quickly into the job market, and have nearly zero accumulated assets;
other migrants fit between these in varying degrees. So the utility impact can range from trivial to very considerable among potential migrants.
As we noted above, availability of certain local public services at the migration destination decreases the expected intensity of these costs. Thus, we can expect a double form of self selection: by individuals and destinations, If no destination has cost-moderating public services, the possible severity of settling-in costs may absolutely discourage any migration by those who would be especially hard hit. Insofar as such services are available in different measure at different destinations, this group of individuals will be less deterred from migrating at all, and will tend to select destinations possessing the highest levels of such services, all other things equal. Since prospective transition costs may exert an absolute veto on migration, this basis for their selecting a migration destination may be extremely compelling. From any origin, a given individual will choose, among all potential destinations (including the status quo), the one promising the greatest expected utility increase: a combination of the net effects of the various benefit and cost dimensions discussed, and of the qualifications imposed by relative degrees of information. This means that for this individual the probabilities of him or her moving from i to each of the alternative destinations are all interdependent, since all alternatives are simultaneously competing against one another in the choice. This interdependence has significance for the econometric procedures that can be used to study migration choice empirically.
2.
For a given individual, the probability of moving from a given origin to a particular destination depends on the net attractiveness of that particular move relative to that of all other possible moves or of remaining at the origin. If benefits from alternative moves are not positively associated with distance from origin to destination then, since total costs are probably a monotonically increasing function of distance, the probability of a move from i to some j is partly a measure of the size of the set of intervening net opportunities -i.e., the attractiveness of all destinations closer than j With this role played by distance, the distance variable can now be seen 29 as a composite of at least four distinct, but probably mutually consistent, roles influencing migration:
a.
It has a positive impact on moving costs;
b.
It has a positive impact on the utility significance of the "loss" of friends and relatives; c.
It is inversely related to the adequacy of information about the destination;
d.
It is positively related to the maximum size of the net attractiveness of intervening destinations between i and j .
Thus, the overall negative impact carried by distance on the probability of choosing a particular destination is probably far in excess of the importance of sheer moving costs over that distance. Greenwood (1975) , and the 89 item bibliography referring primarily to less developed countries in Lorene Y.L. Yap (1975) .
2
This whole section has benefited heavily from Paul A. David (1974), and Vernon Renshaw (1970) . The second source developed a framework which integrated migration with other forms of labor market adjustment. The first stressed the two-stage decision package including migration and variable job search, and also developed the dependence of the gains from search on the variance of the original probability distribution of income prospects.
3 See E.B. Lucas (April 1975 
